Tillman Surveillance - Fri, Jul 24, 2020

The session opened with the agents continuing their surveillance of the suspected detention facility outside El Paso, Texas.

• The Handler recapped the previous session:
  • Six hours after Rennick provided the agents with a phone number, Jerry called it and left the team’s proposal.
  • By midnight, the agents had been directed from a Baltimore bar, through an alley, and into a dusty basement where they met a woman calling herself Jessie.
  • Andy told Jessie everything the team had learned about:
    • Paper Crown.
    • Cornucopia House.
    • Esau Tillman.
    • The children involved in the investigation.
    • The Program’s refusal to act.
    • The rats and birds associated with the phenomenon.
    • The team’s growing suspicion that simply learning about the phenomenon might draw a person into its cycle.
  • Jessie believed the agents’ account, but that belief made her reluctant to involve anyone else.
    • She considered the phenomenon potentially dangerous as an information hazard.
    • She refused to accept the team’s full report or bring her organization completely into the operation.
    • She nevertheless agreed to provide limited assistance.
  • The following day, instructions led the agents to an old storage unit in Oklahoma.
    • The unit contained untraceable pistols.
    • Sawed-off shotguns.
    • A Vietnam-era grenade.
    • Cash.
    • Miscellaneous equipment and relics apparently left from another clandestine operation.
  • Because the agents could not fly, they drove south to El Paso.
  • They established a concealed surveillance position on a hill overlooking the Franklin Harvey water reclamation plant.
  • Behind the legitimate reclamation facility was a fenced, warehouse-like structure that appeared to operate continuously.
  • Ernie used a Stingray-style cellular surveillance device to identify phones that remained at the suspected detention site overnight.
  • By searching leaked records, the agents had identified three of the phones as belonging to:
    • Ethan Bailey.
    • Nurse Huang Lan Fan.
    • Terry Smedley.
  • During daylight hours, the site became more active.
    • The agents estimated approximately nine staff members were present during the daytime.
    • Approximately five remained overnight.
  • A sheriff’s vehicle delivered an adult detainee to the site.
  • A young, baby-faced man matching older photographs of Esau Tillman arrived in a large SUV.
  • Life Force employees moved around the compound in yellow shirts.
  • After approximately 24 hours of surveillance, the agents had confirmed:
    • The detention facility was real.
    • Terry Smedley was at the facility.
    • Esau Tillman was at the facility.
  • The remaining problem was determining what was occurring inside the site and how the agents could stop it.

The agents were positioned on and around the hilltop overlooking the facility at approximately 4:00 p.m.

• Most of the group had been spending time behind the crest of the hill to remain in the shade and rest.
• One or two people at a time maintained active visual surveillance from the top with binoculars and a camera equipped with a long-range lens.
• Ernie and Andy were identified as the agents actively watching the site at that moment.

Ernie and Andy both made successful Alertness checks while observing the facility.

• Because they had noticed something significant, the Handler called for SAN checks.
• Andy critically failed his SAN check.
• While scanning the front of the warehouse-like detention building with binoculars, Andy passed over Esau Tillman.
  • Andy had not seen Tillman come outside.
  • Tillman was standing near the entrance.
  • As Andy’s binoculars passed over him, Tillman appeared to be staring directly back at Andy from approximately half a kilometer away.
• The apparent direct eye contact at that distance was deeply unsettling.
• Andy lost 1 SAN from helplessness.

Andy immediately lowered the binoculars and moved back down the hill.

• He was concerned that sunlight might have reflected from the binocular lenses and revealed the surveillance position.
• He attempted to determine whether the sun’s angle could have caused a visible glint.
• Andy had only 10% in Survival and did not have enough expertise to confidently determine whether the binoculars could have reflected sunlight toward Tillman.
• Andy told the others that Tillman had been staring directly at their position and believed Tillman knew they were there.

Ernie initially resisted checking the location himself, reasoning that the event might have been coincidence.

• After Andy insisted that Tillman had been standing at the entrance, Ernie used the long-range camera to check.
• When Ernie brought the entrance into view, the door was simply swinging closed.
• No one was visible outside by then.
• Andy maintained that Tillman had just gone back inside.

The agents discussed whether Andy should still attempt to enter the facility under his DEA cover.

• Andy had already been considering going inside before the encounter with Tillman.
• The new incident made him less eager to visit while Tillman was physically present.
• The group noted that Tillman had arrived at approximately 7:00 a.m., so he apparently did leave the site at least occasionally.
• Andy proposed presenting himself as a DEA agent trying to locate a suspect who might have been detained at the facility.
  • He planned to explain that the facility’s records might be incomplete.
  • He would ask to inspect detainee records in person.
  • The cover story would give him a legitimate reason to see the detention site’s records and potentially its interior.
• The agents noted that the facility housed at least some adults, because they had previously watched an adult detainee being delivered.
• They therefore planned to choose a plausible adult suspect rather than risk giving a description incompatible with the facility’s population.

Ernie prepared several malicious USB drives for Andy to carry inside.

• The drives contained an autorun-style infiltration suite and several possible backdoors.
• The intention was for Andy to connect one to a facility computer if he had an opportunity.
• If a drive was successfully inserted, Ernie would make the relevant Computer Science roll to determine whether the intrusion worked.
• The team recognized that a privately operated detention contractor might have better or worse computer security than a government office, but they did not know what systems would be present.

The agents considered the visibility of their vehicles and surveillance position.

• They had driven into the desert at night, reducing the chance that a dust trail would expose their route.
• Leaving the hill during daylight could create a conspicuous dust cloud.
• The team decided that waiting until after sunset would reduce the chance that anyone at the facility would notice them driving away.
• The Handler determined that sunset in El Paso in July would be around 8:00 p.m.
• By approximately 8:30 or 9:00 p.m., the agents believed they could leave with little chance of being observed.

Andy specifically wanted to wait for Tillman to leave before entering the facility.

• The agents continued observing through sunset.
• At approximately 5:00 p.m., a normal shift change occurred:
  • Some vehicles departed.
  • Other vehicles arrived.
• Tillman’s vehicle remained at the facility.
• Tillman himself did not reappear after the earlier incident outside.
• The agents noted that, despite arriving around 7:00 a.m., he was still apparently on site after 8:00 p.m.
• The team found his extended presence unusual.

The agents had gathered additional visual information about personnel during the surveillance.

• Most employees arrived in ordinary clothing.
• When working inside the compound, many wore a loose uniform consisting of:
  • Yellow polo shirts.
  • Similar-colored or similarly styled pants.
• These uniforms did not resemble military or standard law-enforcement uniforms.
• When Tillman had arrived, he had been in plain clothes.
• When Andy saw him standing outside later, Tillman appeared to have changed into dark clothing that might have been some type of uniform, although it did not match the yellow Life Force clothing and was not immediately recognizable.

Ernie continued monitoring cellular activity with the Stingray.

• The equipment had been operating for more than 24 hours.
• Battery reserves were beginning to run down, although the device remained functional.
• The agents had solar charging capability and had been using the intense El Paso sunlight to help maintain their equipment.
• Terry Smedley’s phone remained at the site throughout the day.
  • It had been much less active during daylight than overnight.
  • It was largely inactive between roughly 6:00 a.m. and noon.
  • After noon, it showed occasional bursts of activity.
  • It remained connected to the cellular network for most of the day.

As the agents waited later into the night, Robert and Brian made Luck checks.

• Robert rolled a critical success.
• Brian also succeeded.
• At approximately 10:30 p.m., two vehicles finally departed the detention site.
  • One was Tillman’s vehicle.
  • The other was described as a Kia Sorento.
• Because of the darkness, the agents could not clearly identify the person entering the Kia.
• Ernie noticed that Terry Smedley’s phone stopped pinging the Stingray as the Kia departed.
• The agents therefore inferred that Smedley was probably leaving in that vehicle.
• Both vehicles traveled south toward El Paso along the highway.
• Brian watched the taillights carefully to make sure neither vehicle turned toward the agents’ concealed hill position.
• The vehicles continued away and disappeared into the distance.
• By approximately 11:00 p.m., both Tillman and apparently Smedley had left the site.

With Tillman gone, Andy prepared to approach the facility.

• He had a burner phone available in case anyone asked for contact information.
• When he reached the main entrance area, however, he discovered a problem:
  • The outer gate serving the water reclamation plant was closed.
  • The gatehouse was dark.
  • The gate was locked.
• Earlier in the day, a gate attendant had been present to operate the entrance.
• Employees leaving after hours appeared to have their own means of opening and closing the gate.
• The gate seemed to use an electronic keypad or code system rather than merely a simple padlock.
• Andy did not want to break into the outer gate and then immediately claim to be visiting on legitimate federal business.

The agents attempted to find a direct phone number for the detention site.

• Andy tried to obtain one through DEA channels.
• The Handler allowed a Bureaucracy check because the detention facility, while obscure, still processed detainees through government-related systems.
• Andy narrowly failed the Bureaucracy check.
• His requests might eventually produce information, but he had no idea whether an answer would arrive that night, the next day, or at all.

Ernie then tried a personal contact.

• He had a Bond with a friend named Stanislav who worked for the FBI.
• Ernie called Stanislav in the middle of the night on the East Coast, around 2:00 to 2:30 a.m.
• Stanislav questioned why Ernie needed a phone number for the facility and observed that, if the request were fully official, Ernie should be able to obtain it through ordinary channels.
• Ernie admitted that he was asking for a favor connected to a case but could not explain the details.
• The Handler gave Ernie the choice of:
  • Making a Persuade roll.
  • Spending a Bond point to guarantee Stanislav’s cooperation.
• Ernie chose to spend one point from the Bond.
• Stanislav reluctantly searched for the information and eventually gave Ernie a phone number.
• Ernie thanked him and sent the number to Andy by text.

Andy called the detention facility.

• Someone answered after several rings and identified the location only by a facility number.
• Andy introduced himself as Agent Banks.
• He said he was working on a case involving a suspect who might be detained there.
• He explained that he needed to cross-reference the suspect against the facility’s detainees and potentially arrange for the person to be deported.
• He asked permission to come to the facility despite the late hour.
• The employee informed him that normal operating hours were 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
• Andy attempted to persuade the employee to let him come immediately, invoking workload and quotas.
• He rolled 76 against a 70 Persuade skill and failed.
• The employee remained polite but firm:
  • The detainees were not going anywhere overnight.
  • Once the gates were closed, staff were not authorized to process transfers.
  • Andy could return first thing in the morning and the day staff would assist him.
• Andy thanked the employee and said he would come in the morning.

The team remained in the desert overnight.

• They kept watch in shifts and slept as much as possible.
• The group had previously purchased a truck camper rather than merely a camper shell.
  • It included sleeping and basic living facilities.
  • It had at least limited water and bathroom capability.
• A Luck check confirmed that the camper’s systems were still functioning adequately.
• The agents had been conservative enough with their water that they could wash themselves and use the bathroom.
• This allowed Andy to clean up enough that he would look like an agent who had driven into El Paso for work rather than a man who had spent two days sweating on a desert hill.

The agents observed the facility again the following morning.

• At approximately 6:45 a.m., an older man arrived to staff the outer gatehouse.
• Around 7:00 to 7:15 a.m., a significant number of employee vehicles began arriving for the morning shift.
• Andy cleaned himself up and drove to the facility in the team’s rental SUV.
• The agents described the rental as something similar to a Ford Explorer.

Andy approached the outer gate.

• The gate attendant was an older, weathered man, approximately in his mid-sixties.
• He had been smoking a cigarette in the gatehouse.
• The attendant asked who Andy was and then demanded to see a badge.
• Andy showed his DEA credentials.
• The attendant approached closely enough to inspect them.
• He then produced a clipboard containing a visitor log.
  • The form appeared extremely informal.
  • It contained spaces for names and arrival information but little explanation.
• Andy deliberately wrote his information very illegibly.
• The attendant barely examined what he wrote.
• He directed Andy through the reclamation plant and told him:
  • Drive through the plant.
  • Take an access road on the left.
  • Follow it to the end.
• The gatekeeper said he would radio ahead to the detention facility and inform them that Andy was coming.

Andy drove through the plant to the inner compound.

• A young Life Force employee, approximately in his mid-twenties with light brown hair and a yellow polo shirt, was waiting at the inner gate.
• The employee asked to see Andy’s badge again.
• After inspecting it, he opened the electronic gate.
• Andy drove into the parking area.
• The employee told him he would need to pass through the security checkpoint and then speak with the site’s facilitator.

As Andy pulled into the compound, Esau Tillman’s SUV appeared behind him.

• Tillman had apparently returned to the facility at approximately the same time Andy arrived.
• Tillman drove through the already-open gate and parked moments after Andy.
• As Andy approached the security checkpoint, Tillman walked alongside him.
• Tillman looked at Andy and stated that the checkpoint was slow and that he was going first.
• Andy allowed him to go ahead.

Andy observed Tillman passing through security.

• The security employee addressed him as “Agent Tillman.”
• Tillman did not receive any visibly special exemption from the metal detector.
  • He automatically emptied items such as his phone into a container.
  • He walked through the detector.
  • He retrieved his belongings.
• The process was extremely routine for him and barely slowed him down.
• Tillman entered the facility without further conversation.

Andy was then processed through security.

• The guards temporarily took his firearm because detainees were housed inside the building.
• The procedure otherwise appeared relatively normal for a detention environment.
• Andy noted that interior doors appeared to use magnetic key-card readers.

Andy entered the front security and operations area.

• The security section included:
  • Computers.
  • A view into the operations room.
  • A vehicle intake area accessible from another entrance.
• The adjacent vehicle intake area appeared to be the location where law-enforcement vehicles delivered detainees.
  • The sheriff’s vehicle the team had previously observed had parked in this area before backing out.
• Through a large window, Andy could see the main operations room.
  • It contained multiple displays.
  • Computers.
  • Camera controls.
  • A conference table.

Andy met Deb Richter in the operations room.

• Deb was a heavyset blonde woman.
• She wore a name tag identifying her as “Deb Richter.”
• She was the first Life Force employee Andy had seen wearing a visible name tag.
• Deb confirmed that Andy was Agent Banks and asked about the detainee he was trying to locate.

Andy used a deliberately generic cover story for the suspect.

• He described someone with a common Hispanic name, such as José Rodriguez.
• He said the person might be detained under an alias.
• He asked whether he could inspect:
  • The current detainee roster.
  • Intake photographs.
  • Potentially records of previous detainees who had already been transferred or deported.
• Deb accepted the request as fairly normal.
• She offered to give Andy a tablet and let him review detainee photographs.

Andy made a critical success on a Bureaucracy check while observing the facility’s administrative practices.

• He immediately recognized that the detention center was very poorly organized.
• Confidential detainee paperwork was sitting openly on the conference table.
• Deb did not seem concerned that sensitive records were left exposed.
• She simply stacked some documents and pushed them aside to make room.
• The casual handling of records suggested serious administrative weaknesses.

Andy studied how the operations room functioned.

• At that point, he had seen only a few employees in the immediate area, in addition to Tillman.
• The facility appeared understaffed relative to its responsibilities.
• A modern surveillance station occupied part of the room.
  • It contained multiple monitors.
  • A keyboard and camera-control equipment.
  • The surveillance system looked comparatively new and sophisticated despite the poor administrative practices elsewhere.
• Andy had no SIGINT skill and could not determine technical details about the system.

Another employee was operating the surveillance station.

• His name was Alex Watson.
• Alex appeared to be in his mid-thirties.
• He had short hair and glasses.
• He wore the yellow Life Force clothing.
• He was monitoring the facility’s cameras through a headset.
• Most camera feeds showed detention cells or other interior areas.
• When Andy engaged Alex in conversation, Alex readily removed his headset and came over to talk.
• He seemed bored with his normal duties and interested in hearing about DEA fieldwork.

Andy reviewed the detainee population through both records and camera feeds.

• The population was heavily skewed toward juveniles.
• Most detainees were boys roughly between 10 and 16 or 17 years old.
• There were also several dozen girls.
• Only a small number of adult men were present.
• No adult women were apparent.
• Initially, Andy did not see children in approximately the two-to-five-year-old age range.
• The adult detainees seemed relatively transitory compared with the juveniles.

Andy tried to create an opportunity to plant Ernie’s USB drives.

• He repeatedly poured coffee for himself, Deb, and Alex.
• His intention was to keep the others drinking until someone eventually had to leave for the bathroom.
• He preferred to compromise the computer controlling the camera system if possible, although any internal computer would be useful.

After approximately 40 minutes, Deb stood up and said she had to take care of something.

• She left through a card-controlled door on the north side of the operations room.
• Andy briefly saw that the door opened onto a hallway.
• The door closed behind her.
• Alex remained in the room.
• He continued enthusiastically asking Andy about dangerous DEA work and cartel gunfights.

Andy attempted to use Alex’s interest as a distraction.

• He began telling Alex a story about DEA operations.
• While holding folders and detainee paperwork, he intentionally dropped documents near Deb’s computer.
• He bent down to collect the papers.
• While doing so, he attempted to insert one of Ernie’s malicious USB drives into Deb’s computer.

Andy failed the Stealth check catastrophically in practical terms.

• He rolled 96.
• He had difficulty physically inserting the USB drive and spent too long fumbling with the port.
• Alex noticed his unusual behavior and asked what he was doing.
• Andy immediately improvised an explanation:
  • He claimed he had found the USB drive on the floor.
  • He said he thought it had fallen out of Deb’s computer.
  • He claimed he was simply trying to put it back.
• Alex held out his hand for the drive.
• Andy gave it to him.
• Alex inspected it and said it was not part of their system.
• He asked where Andy had found it.
• Andy repeated that it had been lying on the floor near Deb’s computer.
• Alex said he would ask Deb about it and pocketed the USB drive.

Andy used HUMINT to evaluate Alex afterward.

• The check succeeded.
• Andy could tell that Alex was now substantially less interested in the DEA story.
• Alex was much more focused on the unexplained USB drive.
• Andy also got the impression that Alex might be the facility’s computer specialist or at least the person most responsible for the surveillance systems.
• Alex eventually returned to his surveillance station.
• When Deb returned, Alex did not immediately confront her about the USB drive.

Andy continued reviewing detainee files.

• A Law check resulted in a critical success.
• He noticed several significant patterns.
• Adult detainees did not remain at the facility long.
  • Local law enforcement appeared to drop them off.
  • Other authorities or transport personnel picked them up soon afterward.
  • None seemed to remain for extended periods.
• The juveniles remained considerably longer.
• The children’s files were commonly marked:
  • “Accompanied.”
  • “Awaiting representation.”
• This was notable because the files generally lacked meaningful information identifying the children’s parents.
• Some children had been held for weeks or months.
• Based on his law-enforcement knowledge, Andy inferred that the contractor had found some procedural method or loophole allowing it to hold these juveniles almost indefinitely.
• Andy also understood that ICE paid the private company based on the number of detainees it housed.
• Keeping the juvenile beds filled therefore provided the facility with a continuing source of revenue.

Andy expanded his cover story to justify examining child records.

• He told Deb that his fictional suspect might have children.
• He picked children with names similar to the suspect’s supposed name and asked whether the facility had information about their parents.
• This allowed him to probe how family relationships were recorded.
• The records remained incomplete and inconsistent.

Andy asked to physically see a detainee who might match his fictional suspect.

• His stated reason was to verify visual details such as tattoos.
• His actual purpose was to get access to the detention area and inspect the facility himself.
• While he was discussing this with Deb, another Life Force employee overheard the conversation and offered to give Andy a tour.

The Life Force employee who escorted Andy was part of the security staff.

• The Handler later referred to him as Jaden.
• Jaden seemed happy to show a federal law-enforcement officer around the building.

Jaden first took Andy through the processing area.

• The room contained:
  • A computer.
  • Camera equipment used for intake photographs.
  • Other processing equipment.
• Andy recognized it as the probable location where the detainee photographs he had reviewed were taken.

The tour continued through the intake changing and shower facilities.

• Detainees were stripped and changed into facility clothing there.
• Jaden then passed employee locker rooms without spending much time explaining them.

The facility’s interior equipment generally looked quite new.

• The employees’ rest and support areas were substantially better equipped than the detainee areas.
• One room served as a place where staff could rest or sleep.
  • It had beds divided by cubicle-like partitions.
• Nearby was a well-equipped armory.
  • It contained shotguns.
  • Full tactical armor.
  • Helmets.
  • Flashbangs.
  • Night-vision equipment.
• Jaden enthusiastically showed Andy some of the tactical equipment.
• Andy played along, expressing interest in the night-vision gear.

Andy noticed a closed office identified as belonging to Jonathan Lowe, CEO.

• Jaden described it as where “the boss” stayed or worked.
• The room was closed during the tour.

Andy saw another unusual secured door in the hallway.

• It had a magnetic card reader.
• A sign on it read essentially:
  • “Keep Out.”
  • “Life Force Employees Only.”
• Andy critically succeeded on an Alertness check and immediately recognized the sign as peculiar.
  • Almost everyone working in the facility was already a Life Force employee.
  • Prisoners were not freely wandering the halls and therefore did not need a “Keep Out” warning.
• The room therefore appeared to be restricted even from most ordinary facility staff.
• Andy noted that Tillman, who worked for ICE rather than Life Force, would not technically be covered by the wording on the sign.

Jaden took Andy into the main holding area.

• This was the area Andy had previously seen on the surveillance monitors.
• The room contained multiple cages holding detainees.
• Conditions were harsh and sparse.
  • Cheap rubber mattresses.
  • Foil blankets.
  • Very few personal possessions.
  • Stacks of plastic cups.
  • Communal concrete troughs.
  • Faucets providing drinking water.
• There was no obvious bathing facility inside the holding room itself.
• Approximately 80 detainees were being held there.

The Handler revised an earlier description of the population once Andy saw the holding area directly.

• There were some infants after all.
• The infants were held in a cage with young girls.
  • The girls appeared to be caring for the babies.
  • The girls ranged roughly from seven years old into their early teens.
• Other cages contained large numbers of boys ranging from childhood into adolescence.
• A smaller number of adult men were also present.
• The detainees generally looked exhausted and emotionally numb.
• Because Andy was a law-enforcement officer accustomed to detention environments, the Handler did not require a helplessness SAN check for seeing the conditions.

Andy examined the physical security of the holding room.

• There were approximately six holding areas or cages.
• Elevated walkways or platforms ran along parts of the room.
• Life Force employees were stationed above, watching the detainees.
• Surveillance cameras were positioned in the corners.
• The camera layout provided extremely thorough coverage of the room.
• Other cameras had also been visible throughout the hallways, but the detention chamber was especially well monitored.

Andy noticed a large secured garage door in the holding area.

• Several 50-gallon drums were positioned in front of it.
• The garage door was secured with a heavy chain.
• The chain ran through a metal anchor point or loop fixed into the concrete floor.
• The door appeared to be deliberately kept closed and inaccessible.

Andy asked Jaden to let him conduct an interview with one of the adult detainees.

• He framed it as part of his fictional DEA investigation.
• A chair was brought over for him.
• Andy asked for some privacy because the investigation was supposedly sensitive.
• Jaden and the other staff remained in the room but did not stand directly over Andy while he talked.

Andy switched to Spanish when speaking to detainees.

• He attempted to determine whether Jaden understood Spanish by making a casual remark in Spanish while watching for a reaction.
• A HUMINT check failed to produce a useful answer because Jaden had his back turned and was moving away.
• Andy therefore did not know whether the guard understood what he was saying.

Andy interviewed one of the adult male detainees.

• He quietly identified himself as DEA rather than ICE.
• He mixed genuine questions into a set of fabricated investigative questions to maintain his cover.
• The adult had been at the facility only a few days.
• He did not know what was behind the chained garage door.
• According to him, the door had never been opened while he was present.
• When Andy asked who had been there longest, the man indicated that some of the boys had been held much longer.
• None of the adult men appeared to have been held more than approximately five days.
• The adult detainees were not the parents of the children in the nearby cages.
• They did not know what had happened to the children’s parents.
• They also did not know why the population appeared to have a gap in certain young-child age ranges.

Andy then moved to the cage holding young boys.

• He asked who among them had been at the facility the longest.
• The group indicated a boy approximately eight or nine years old.
• The boy did not appear eager to speak with Andy.
• Andy first asked him, loudly enough to support the cover story, whether his last name was Rodriguez.
• The boy said no.
• Andy then lowered his voice and began asking his real questions.

The boy said he did not know what was behind the chained garage door.

• He said the door did not open.
• Andy asked what had happened to his parents.
• The boy said his parents had been at the facility for a day or two after he arrived.
• They had then been taken away.
• He had been left behind.
• He did not know where his parents had gone.

Andy asked whether the boy or anyone in the cage had siblings between roughly two and five years old.

• Andy failed the Persuade roll by a small margin, rolling 75 against 70.
• The children answered no, but Andy could tell they were reluctant to engage with him.
• He therefore could not be sure the answers were truthful.

Andy continued asking the children neutral questions about how they had arrived and how long they had been held.

• By framing his questions carefully, he was able to get a reasonably consistent account from multiple children.
• Their experiences followed a recurring pattern:
  • Some had already been separated from their parents before arriving.
  • Others were separated from their parents at the facility.
  • They were told they were being held until they obtained representation and could appear before a court.
  • They did not know when this would happen.
  • They did not understand what was supposed to happen next.
• Many had been detained for weeks or months.

Andy then asked whether anything unusual happened around the chained garage door or beyond it.

• He succeeded on the Persuade check.
• The question produced the clearest emotional reaction he had seen from the children.
  • Fear.
  • Anger.
  • Visible tension throughout the group.
• An older boy, approximately 14 years old, spoke up angrily.
• He said the men who worked “in there” were assholes.

The older boy described armed ICE personnel entering the holding area.

• According to him:
  • They wore actual ICE identification and tactical gear.
  • They carried guns.
  • They entered the detention room in force.
  • They pushed the children around.
  • They used hoses on them.
  • They laughed while doing it.
• The description sounded to Andy like tactical operators dressed for riot control rather than ordinary detention officers.
• The boy indicated that these incidents were instigated by the men associated with the restricted area near the garage door.
• Andy was recording this portion of the interview so that the other agents could review it later.

Jaden returned while Andy was speaking with the children and asked whether he was nearly finished.

• Andy stopped pushing further.
• He explained that he had gathered material he could send to digital-forensics personnel to determine whether any detainee matched his fictional suspect.
• He said he doubted they had the right person but thanked Jaden for the assistance.
• Jaden commented that Andy would need to find the suspect before the facility sent him back across the border.

Jaden escorted Andy back toward the security area.

• Andy’s firearm was returned to him.
• Before leaving, Andy asked to use the bathroom.
• Jaden directed him to an employee bathroom near the locker rooms.
• The bathroom was co-ed and contained:
  • Stalls.
  • Sinks.
  • Showers.

Andy used the bathroom as an opportunity to deploy another malicious USB drive.

• He left one of Ernie’s USB drives in a stall.
• He placed it somewhere noticeable enough that an employee might find it, but not so conspicuous that it would obviously appear planted.
• He hoped someone such as Deb might discover it and connect it to a computer.

Andy returned to the front of the facility.

• He had not seen Tillman again after Tillman passed through security that morning.
• Based on the parts of the building he had seen, Andy suspected Tillman might have gone into:
  • The restricted Life Force-only area.
  • Jonathan Lowe’s office.
  • Another area inaccessible during the tour.
• He did not have direct evidence of where Tillman had gone.

Andy exited the building and returned to the parking lot.

• He still had one malicious USB drive remaining.
• He considered leaving it near a random employee vehicle.
• Because he knew exactly which SUV belonged to Esau Tillman, he instead placed the final USB drive near the driver’s side of Tillman’s vehicle.
• His intention was to make it look like an accidentally dropped drive that Tillman might pick up.
• No one visibly challenged or stopped Andy while he did this.
• Andy then drove away from the facility.

Andy did not immediately return to the surveillance hill.

• Driving a vehicle directly from the facility into the desert during daylight would have been conspicuous.
• He instead headed back toward El Paso.
• The remaining agents stayed positioned near the surveillance site.

Before ending the session, the team investigated Esau Tillman’s and Terry Smedley’s home addresses.

• Ernie used online searching and Computer Science to try to locate them.
• He failed the Computer Science check with an 84 against an 80 skill.
• Despite the failure, he learned that neither Tillman nor Smedley appeared to have an easily discoverable residential address in El Paso or the nearby area through the sources he searched.

The team had one additional lead for Tillman: his vehicle license plate.

• Andy could legitimately access Texas DMV information through his DEA credentials.
• Running the plate would create a traceable government query under his DEA identity, but the agents considered that reasonably defensible because law-enforcement officers routinely ran license plates.
• Andy agreed to make the search and planned to run several similar plates as camouflage.

The DMV search produced a vehicle registration associated with “E. Tillman.”

• The registration listed an El Paso address.
• Cross-referencing the address showed that it belonged to a small apartment or condominium complex with approximately six units.
• The unusual detail was that Tillman’s registration did not contain a unit number.
• It listed only the apartment complex itself.
• The agents therefore had a physical location associated with Tillman but did not yet know which specific unit, if any, was his.

The session ended with the agents possessing several significant new pieces of information:

• Andy had successfully entered and toured the detention facility under his DEA identity.
• The site was poorly administered despite having modern surveillance equipment and substantial tactical gear.
• The detainee population consisted predominantly of juveniles, many of whom had been held for weeks or months.
• Adult detainees appeared to move through the facility quickly.
• Juvenile records were commonly marked “accompanied” and “awaiting representation” despite often lacking usable information about parents.
• ICE payments for detainees gave the private contractor a financial incentive to maintain a full population.
• Children described being separated from their parents and then effectively stranded at the facility.
• Armed ICE tactical personnel periodically entered the holding room, pushed detainees around, sprayed them with hoses, and laughed.
• The children associated this treatment with personnel connected to a restricted part of the building.
• A heavily chained garage door existed inside the main holding area.
• Another card-controlled interior door was marked “Keep Out, Life Force Employees Only.”
• Esau Tillman was routinely addressed as “Agent Tillman” by facility security.
• Tillman had disappeared into some part of the building not included in Andy’s tour.
• One of Ernie’s malicious USB drives had been confiscated by Alex Watson after Andy’s failed attempt to insert it into Deb Richter’s computer.
• A second drive had been left in the employee bathroom.
• A third had been left beside Tillman’s SUV.
• Terry Smedley appeared to work overnight and had likely departed the facility in a Kia Sorento.
• Tillman had an El Paso vehicle registration tied to a small apartment complex, but the registration contained no unit number.
• The agents planned to continue the investigation from these leads in the next session.