Tillman Interdiction Preperations - Thu, Jul 23, 2020

The session opened with the Handler recapping the agents’ prior findings and the immediate situation confronting the team.

• The agents had completed their analysis of Conrad Hopko and the “Paper Crown” phenomenon.
• Their evidence indicated that Conrad Hopko, Jacob Tillman, Esau Tillman, and Conradin were all identities or manifestations of the same individual.
• This individual was believed to be the last missing child from Cornucopia House.
• He was now associated with ICE detention operations and appeared to be using that position to recreate conditions disturbingly similar to those of Cornucopia House.
• Dr. Ming had identified language development as a possible dividing line between children who remained trapped under the Paper Crown’s influence and children such as Nikochilikov who had escaped its worst effects.
• The implication was that early intervention might still allow the agents to save children currently in Tillman’s custody.
• Reverend Jerry had made clear that Agent Clove’s old proposal to kill affected children could be documented in the team’s report, but the current team would never endorse that approach.
• On Monday morning, Agent Rennick had arrived to receive the team’s report.
• Andy had presented the evidence, explained the danger, and recommended an investigation of the situation in El Paso with the goal of removing the children.
• Rennick initially refused to authorize such an operation.
• He explained that Tillman was protected by a politically sensitive federal system, and that an official Delta Green operation against the detention site could expose the Program to elected officials who could not be trusted with knowledge of Delta Green.
• Rennick suggested that something might possibly be done in 12 to 18 months if the political situation changed after the election.
• The agents then showed Rennick the window where pigeons had repeatedly flown into the glass and killed themselves.
• Their blood and remains had formed the same message previously encountered among the rat-damaged files: “Go to him.”
• The escalation convinced Rennick that the matter exceeded his authority, and he attempted to contact his superiors.
• Ernie secretly interfered with Rennick’s attempt to make that call.
• Andy attempted to contact former MASTICATE handler Antonia Pitzarelli but reached only her secretary.
• After Reverend Jerry pressed Rennick to make use of four people who were already willing to act, Rennick broke with Program procedure.
• Rennick provided the team with a telephone number and instructed them to call it in six hours.
• He said the people answering that number might be able to help.
• Rennick also ordered the agents to falsify their official report so that the Program would not learn the full details of the Tillman situation.
• The consequence was clear: the Program itself was going to do nothing about Tillman, and stopping him had become the responsibility of the agents.

The agents had approximately six hours before they were supposed to call Rennick’s contact.

• They considered whether they needed additional equipment, particularly firearms and other supplies for a potential confrontation.
• Because they expected eventually to travel to El Paso, they discussed the problem of transporting firearms by air.
• Andy, as a federal law-enforcement agent, might have had some options for transporting a service weapon, although the exact rules were uncertain.
• The team recognized that most firearms would likely need to be checked when flying.
• At this point they had not been issued burner phones or other special communications equipment for the operation.

At approximately 5:30 p.m., after the six-hour waiting period, the team called the number Rennick had provided.

• Reverend Jerry made the call.
• A recorded male voice answered.
• The message stated that a mutual friend had informed them of the agents’ problem and that they might be able to help.
• The recording instructed the callers to leave their proposal and any official documentation they possessed after the beep.
• The agents were also told to provide a “clean” telephone number where they could later be contacted with instructions.
• Because the team had not obtained burner phones, Jerry left his personal telephone number.
• The agents had both versions of their report available: the original report containing their actual conclusions and the falsified version intended for the Program.

Roughly an hour later, Jerry received a return call.

• The caller sounded like the same man whose voice had been on the recording.
• He provided an address and instructed the agents to be there at 11:00 p.m.
• The address corresponded to a small bar in Baltimore that the Handler named the Norwood Inn.
• The caller also instructed the team to wear a bright green cap.
• No additional explanation was provided before the caller disconnected.

The four agents went to the Norwood Inn for the 11:00 p.m. meeting.

• They acquired bright green caps as instructed.
• They entered the bar together.
• The bar was moderately busy, with people at tables and at the bar and others playing darts.
• The agents obtained beer and sat together at a table.
• Because the session was set in July 2020, the group noted that the establishment was relatively busy despite the COVID-19 pandemic.
• The clientele did not appear to be using masks.

After the agents had spent some time at their table, an African-American man in approximately his 50s walked past them.

• He had short hair with some gray in it.
• As he passed the team, he quietly instructed them to “go out the back.”
• He continued walking rather than remaining with them.
• The agents waited rather than immediately following directly behind him.

The team went toward the rear of the bar and exited through a door near the restrooms into an alley.

• It was around midnight.
• The air remained hot and muggy, although the temperature was beginning to fall.
• Initially they saw no one in the alley.
• Farther away, partially obscured around a turn near some dumpsters, they saw the outline of another person.
• This was a smaller individual than the man from the bar and appeared to be wearing a hoodie and cap.
• The person gestured for the agents to follow and moved away.
• The team followed the guide.
• Jerry was not particularly suspicious of the process and was deliberately trusting the arrangements Rennick had made.

The guide led the team farther through the area and across a street to a basement entrance.

• The person maintained some distance ahead of them and did not engage them in conversation.
• The agents descended the stairs into the basement.
• Inside, they found an interior room with light visible beneath and around a mostly closed door.
• A woman was watching them through the opening.
• She appeared to be Caucasian, approximately 40 years old, with dark hair.
• She also wore a hoodie and cap and was dressed to appear nondescript.

The woman invited the agents into the basement room and told them to sit.

• The room contained a small card table and folding chairs.
• It had no windows.
• The rest of the room was mostly empty except for old, dirty cardboard boxes pushed into the corners.
• The basement was musty and dusty.

The woman immediately asked the agents for their names.

• Ernie identified himself as “Ernie.”
• Dr. Ming gave the false name “Bart.”
• Andy gave his name as “Andy.”
• The woman identified herself as “Jesse.”
• Jesse then asked them to explain their situation.

Andy initially asked Jesse about her relationship to Malcolm Rennick and what kind of experience she had with the kinds of matters Rennick handled.

• Jesse responded that the agents were the people who needed help.
• She explained the terms of the meeting clearly.
• The agents wanted a favor.
• She was willing to hear their proposal.
• If she disliked what she heard, they would part ways and the agents would have to deal with their problem on their own.
• If she considered the matter worthwhile, she and her associates might be willing to contribute assistance.
• Jesse said Rennick had not already explained the agents’ situation to her.

Andy decided to disclose the situation fully rather than withholding the unnatural aspects.

• He explained the Paper Crown as an entity or otherworldly system.
• The agents gave Jesse essentially the same account they had given Rennick.
• They described the history beginning with Cornucopia House and the events that had led them to the present investigation.
• They explained their evidence regarding the Paper Crown and the connection to Tillman.
• They also explained why the Program was unwilling to intervene.
• Jerry supplemented Andy’s explanation with the political concerns that had led Rennick and the Program to refuse action.
• Jesse reacted to that explanation by acknowledging that the Program’s decision was exactly the sort of thing she would expect it to do.

Jesse asked the agents what proof they had for their claims.

• Andy cited both the documentary evidence in the files and the team’s direct experiences.
• He described birds flying into a window and creating messages in blood.
• He also described the rat-related incidents, including agents being attacked and bitten.
• Andy emphasized that the phenomenon was no longer merely something described in paperwork; the team had begun experiencing it directly.
• Jesse physically moved her chair farther away from the agents as she processed the idea that the phenomenon had begun coming after them.

Jesse asked whether the phenomenon had “come for” the agents.

• The team explained that by learning about the phenomenon, they had themselves become incorporated into its cycle.
• They indicated that it potentially functioned as an information hazard.
• The implication that Jesse might now also be exposed by hearing the information was not lost on her.

Andy made a Persuade check while presenting the case.

• He rolled 57 against a Persuade skill of 70, succeeding.
• Jesse spent considerable time considering what the agents had told her.

Over approximately an hour, the team laid out the case in detail.

• Jesse asked questions as she attempted to understand the situation.
• The agents had brought printed copies of both the genuine and falsified reports.
• They explained that important material had deliberately been removed from the falsified version so that Program superiors would not learn the full details.
• They also explained that this alteration had been done on Rennick’s recommendation.
• When Jesse understood that very young children were being abducted, confined, and subjected to worse treatment, she showed a visible emotional response, including clenching her jaw.

At the end of the briefing, Jesse refused to take possession of the agents’ report.

• She also refused to share the details of what they had told her with the other people she knew.
• Her reason was that the information itself might be dangerous.
• Based on the agents’ description, Jesse considered their side of the situation “poisoned” and did not want to spread that danger into her own organization.
• She was angry at the possibility that the agents might already have brought her into the Paper Crown’s cycle.
• She nevertheless remained willing to assist the agents materially.

Jesse offered to arrange equipment for the team.

• She said she could provide firearms.
• She could potentially provide other weapons.
• She might also be able to provide some surveillance equipment.
• She warned that the equipment would be whatever her organization could scrounge together rather than a purpose-built package tailored to the agents’ request.
• Jesse said Jerry’s phone would probably receive another call within approximately 24 hours.
• That call would direct the agents to a location where the equipment could be collected.

Andy asked Jesse whether her organization could produce access badges for the Frank Harvey Water Reclamation Plant.

• Jesse said that was outside what they could provide.
• Access credentials and infiltration arrangements would have to be handled by the agents themselves.
• Her immediate assistance was limited primarily to weapons and possibly surveillance gear.

The agents discussed acquiring a drone.

• Ernie initially thought he might already have one among his equipment but determined that he did not.
• The team recognized that they could purchase one themselves if Jesse’s group did not provide one.

Jesse then began ushering the agents out.

• She told them that she believed they were doing the right thing.
• She also emphasized that they were doing the difficult thing and that the operation would not be easy.
• She said she had no idea how to break the Paper Crown’s cycle.
• She stated that, if the agents were lucky, their intelligence would turn out to be wrong.

Jesse offered a tactical assessment based on what the agents had told her.

• The target was a facility with multiple law-enforcement or security personnel.
• Those personnel were probably armed or had access to weapons.
• They could potentially call local law enforcement for assistance.
• They might also receive assistance from an immigration special-response team.
• Unless the agents could obtain a very effective method of entry or another major advantage, Jesse considered a direct assault to be essentially a special-operations problem.
• She described the possible sequence as entering, securing the location, killing everyone necessary to secure it, and then confronting the far more complicated problem of what to do with a large number of rescued children.
• She considered the entire situation nightmarish.
• She warned that the odds were that the agents would be killed.

Dr. Ming questioned whether providing the team with equipment simply to send them on a suicide mission was a worthwhile use of resources.

• Jesse’s position was that the agents might still get lucky.

Reverend Jerry attempted to persuade Jesse to consider doing more.

• The Handler allowed Jerry to make a Persuade check because of his ability to pressure people through moral arguments.
• Jerry rolled a 71, which was a success.
• Jesse asked how soon the agents intended to go to El Paso.
• Jerry answered that they intended to go as soon as possible.
• Andy reinforced that the problem was ongoing and that delay was undesirable.
• Jesse agreed that waiting was dangerous.

Jesse agreed to reassess the level of assistance after the agents gathered intelligence.

• She told them she would call again in four days.
• At that point, she would listen to their assessment of the tactical situation and whatever operational plan they had developed.
• Depending on what she heard, she might be able to provide additional assistance.
• She made clear that she could not promise more in advance.
• The agents told her that anything she could provide would be useful.
• Andy also told her that they would accept help from anyone else she could contact.
• Jesse described her organization as somewhat volunteer in nature and again expressed hope that the agents could find a way to solve the problem.
• She then left.

The agents used the following day to make arrangements to remain away from their ordinary work and personal obligations.

• Approximately one day after the meeting, Jerry received another telephone call.
• The caller instructed him to go to a locker at the Baltimore Greyhound station.
• Jerry received a code that allowed him to open the locker.
• Inside was a single ordinary-looking key and a folded road map.
• A location in Oklahoma had been circled on the map.
• The map also contained an address and a storage-unit number.
• Looking up the address showed that it belonged to a storage facility.

The team traveled to the southern part of Oklahoma to investigate the storage unit.

• Because the location was in southern Oklahoma, they traveled there and drove to the storage facility.
• The indicated unit was secured by a heavy padlock.
• The key from the Greyhound locker opened it.

The Handler called for a Luck roll while the agents searched the storage unit.

• Andy rolled Luck and failed.
• The unit nevertheless contained a collection of old matériel rather than being empty.
• There were metal shelves and old military-style ammunition boxes, many of them apparently dating from the 1960s or 1970s.

The useful weapons in the cache included several old firearms.

• The agents found small handguns, including Colt-style M1911 semiautomatic pistols chambered in .45 caliber.
• They also found a couple of sawed-off shotguns.
• One old metal box contained a single Vietnam-era hand grenade.
• The grenade was old but appeared likely to remain functional.
• The cache also contained ammunition, although the ammunition was likewise old.
• The agents decided fresher ammunition would be preferable.

The storage unit contained several other items of uncertain or limited utility.

• The agents found high-powered optics, ultimately described as a scope without a rifle.
• They found tattered, bloodstained remnants of old Nazi uniforms.
• They found a shoebox containing approximately 20 old issues of Playboy.
• The magazines were not in mint condition.
• Searching the ammunition boxes and other containers eventually produced approximately $2,000 in cash.
• By the time they finished searching, the agents had acquired a modest collection of untraceable firearms, one grenade, ammunition, optics, and cash.

The agents used some of the cache money to improve their equipment.

• They purchased newer ammunition rather than relying entirely on the aging ammunition from the storage unit.
• They also acquired binoculars and other hunting or surveillance-related supplies.
• The team discussed the value of a deer blind or similar equipment for concealed observation.
• Ernie already possessed tools and parts suitable for electronics work.
• His equipment included items such as tweezers, gloves, a first-aid kit, a wireless router, and a Raspberry Pi.
• He had skills in Craft (Mechanic), Craft (Microelectronics), and Craft (Electrician).
• The Handler ruled that Ernie’s toolbox and existing components would cover basic improvised work, although specialized equipment would require acquiring additional parts.

Because the agents now possessed illegal and untraceable firearms as well as a hand grenade, flying to El Paso was no longer practical.

• They therefore drove from Oklahoma toward El Paso.
• They made sure their rental arrangements could accommodate the long-distance travel.

Upon arriving in the El Paso area, the agents focused on the Frank Harvey Water Reclamation Plant.

• The plant was approximately 20 kilometers north of El Paso.
• It was described as being near Futureland and Mesquite Hills, with other industrial locations scattered through the area.
• The general surroundings were open and sparsely developed.
• A public road ran along the front of the reclamation plant.
• The facility itself was enclosed by fencing.
• Large tanks and water-reclamation pools were visible within the complex.
• The area’s openness made covert physical surveillance difficult because observers and vehicles could potentially be seen from a substantial distance.

Ernie proposed using his StingRay cellular-surveillance equipment as one of the team’s principal intelligence-gathering tools.

• His idea was to capture cellular traffic in the area and determine which phones repeatedly appeared around the detention facility.
• He hoped eventually to identify Conrad Tillman’s device and use it to locate Tillman away from the site.
• Ernie’s broader goal was to collect as much cellular data as possible, identify relevant personnel, and potentially track them to their residences or other off-site locations.
• He preferred the possibility of isolating and killing the key conspirators away from the facility rather than conducting a direct assault on the detention center.

The agents discussed other surveillance possibilities.

• They considered whether local automated license-plate camera systems might be exploitable.
• Ernie had substantial Computer Science skill and was prepared to hack systems if useful.
• Andy, as a DEA agent, had professional experience with surveillance and stakeouts.
• The team also considered obtaining a van or other vehicle that could support electronic-surveillance equipment.

The Handler asked for an appropriate skill check to identify good observation locations.

• Possible skills discussed included Search, Law, and Military Science (Land).
• Andy rolled Search.
• He succeeded with a 21.

Andy’s successful search identified two plausible surveillance positions.

• The first was a hilltop located some distance from the highway.
• From the hill, the agents would have a clear view of the water-reclamation site.
• If they approached from the proper direction and set up a concealed blind, they were unlikely to be noticed.
• The major disadvantage was the July Texas heat.
• The second possible observation point was a Waffle House approximately three-quarters of a kilometer from the facility.
• The Waffle House parking lot offered ordinary civilian traffic, meaning a vehicle could potentially remain there without immediately attracting attention.
• The disadvantage was that the agents themselves would be visible and would need sufficiently powerful optics to observe the facility from that distance.

The team also identified a potential method for legitimate entry.

• Because Andy was a DEA agent, he could potentially approach the site openly as federal law enforcement.
• He could claim to be looking for a detainee or informant who might have been taken into custody.
• This might allow him to speak with personnel and possibly enter parts of the site without immediately exposing hostile intent.
• Reverend Jerry’s Bureau of Prisons background might also provide some institutional familiarity.
• Jerry had Law 30 and Bureaucracy 50.
• The Handler noted that the Bureau of Prisons and ICE sometimes had arrangements under which male immigration detainees were held in federal prisons.
• It was unclear whether Jerry could turn that relationship into direct access to this specific site.

The agents discussed the larger operational problem.

• They did not yet have a firm plan for what they would do after determining the layout and staffing.
• A direct “go in, kill everybody, and then figure out what to do” approach was recognized as extremely dangerous.
• Dr. Ming argued for observing the facility first because the team had repeatedly encountered unexpected unnatural complications.
• Ernie agreed that external surveillance should come first.
• He wanted to determine who was coming and going and identify the principal people associated with Tillman.

The team identified three people they considered particularly important.

• Conrad/Esau/Jacob Tillman was the primary target because of his history at Cornucopia House and his apparent role in recreating it.
• Terry Smedley and Alan Rapp had previously appeared in the investigation as people Tillman wanted involved.
• The team was not certain at this point whether Smedley and Rapp had actually been hired by ICE or were physically present in El Paso.
• Ernie hoped that eliminating the central conspirators might be sufficient to break the cycle without requiring a mass assault on the facility.
• He specifically wanted to minimize the team’s exposure and avoid having to kill numerous on-site personnel.

Jerry raised a separate investigative question about the organization operating the facility.

• He had not originally realized that the detention center was privately operated.
• He wanted to research the company responsible for the site and determine whether there was any connection between the company itself and the Skoptsi or other parts of the Cornucopia House history.
• The team recognized that this could determine whether Tillman was conducting his activities within an otherwise ordinary company or whether the corruption extended more broadly through the organization.

The agents chose the hilltop as their primary surveillance position.

• Their plan was to purchase food, including Waffle House food, and then establish a concealed observation site on the hill.
• They intended to rotate surveillance shifts rather than keeping a single person constantly exposed.
• The Handler allowed them to use operational funds for basic camping supplies.
• They approached the hill under cover of darkness.
• They brought equipment that would allow them to stay behind the hill and use its terrain for shade and concealment.
• They used dirt-colored tarps and similar material to camouflage their position.
• They were able to hike to the observation point and establish a clear view of the target area.

From the hill at night, the agents examined the facility.

• They could see the illuminated parts of the water-reclamation complex through binoculars.
• There was a main gate with a large chain-link gate mounted on rollers.
• A gatehouse controlled access.
• At night, the gatehouse did not appear to be staffed.
• The gate was secure enough for normal access control but did not appear to be a fortress-grade barrier.
• The agents believed a sufficiently large vehicle could probably break through it.

Behind the principal water-reclamation facility, the team identified a separate structure that appeared particularly significant.

• It was a large, single-story warehouse-like building with a metal roof.
• It was offset from the main plant.
• It had its own fence and an interior gate.
• An access road entered through the main gate and continued behind the water-reclamation plant to the secondary gate.
• The rear building was well lit.
• The long side of the structure was estimated at approximately 100 meters.
• The shorter side was approximately 30 to 40 meters.
• It was substantial but not enormous.

The agents continued observing the site through the night.

• Several vehicles remained parked outside the rear facility and did not move during the night.
• The vehicles appeared to be ordinary private vehicles rather than clearly marked government or corporate vehicles.
• They included a relatively new black SUV, a civilian car comparable to a Honda Civic, and another civilian SUV.
• These vehicles were parked near a normal person-sized exterior door.
• The team suspected this area functioned as employee parking.
• The rear building also had a garage door.

The agents considered using a drone to view portions of the site not visible from the hill.

• Driving around the opposite side of the facility was possible but would leave the agents exposed in extremely flat, open terrain.
• A drone could potentially provide a view of the far side without requiring a vehicle to approach visibly.
• The team discussed the limitations of commercial drones, including noise.
• They concluded that a sufficiently capable long-range drone would probably need to be purchased from a specialty vendor in El Paso rather than from a general retail store.
• A suitable high-quality drone was estimated to cost approximately $10,000.
• Dr. Ming was considered financially capable of covering the purchase.
• The agents discussed the possibility of buying it personally and dealing with the expense afterward.
• They also considered obtaining an internet connection at their surveillance position so Ernie could perform online research and hacking.

The agents obtained an old pickup truck with a camper shell to support the surveillance operation.

• They used remaining operational money to acquire a cheap used vehicle rather than an expensive or conspicuous one.
• The truck was described as an old 1997-era Ford/Chevrolet hybrid in appearance, with mismatched parts, including a replacement tailgate.
• The camper was in better condition than the truck itself.
• The vehicle provided a place where the agents could store equipment, sleep between shifts, and maintain the appearance of people camping in the area.
• Ernie had Craft (Mechanic) 30, enough to give him some competence in judging whether the truck would remain functional for their immediate needs.

During the night, Ernie operated the StingRay from the surveillance position.

• The position was close enough that the cellular-surveillance equipment could reach the facility.
• The Handler estimated the effective range in the open terrain at roughly half a kilometer, with the agents near the edge of that range.
• The team’s position was therefore particularly useful because the StingRay could collect traffic from the facility while receiving relatively little from unrelated locations.
• Some passing vehicles on the nearby highway could still briefly appear in the data.

The StingRay detected several persistent cellular devices during the night.

• The agents saw a handful of IMEI and SIM identifiers appear repeatedly.
• Some other devices appeared only briefly, consistent with traffic passing through the area.
• Approximately three or four devices repeatedly reappeared and therefore seemed likely to remain in or near the rear facility.
• The StingRay could provide IMEI and SIM information because the phones were effectively connecting through the agents’ equipment.
• It could potentially allow interception of telephone calls and observation of some internet traffic.
• The hardware and SIM identifiers did not, by themselves, reveal the identities of the owners.
• Identifying owners would require telecom records or other data sources.

At approximately 6:00 a.m., the agents observed what appeared to be a shift change.

• Several vehicles arrived.
• More cell phones began appearing in the StingRay data.
• The facility clearly had a larger population during the day than it did overnight.

The agents reviewed previously known phone information for Conrad Tillman.

• An earlier anonymous report associated with “Scribe Life 420” had listed telephone numbers connected to Conrad and Lee Jarnigan.
• One field in the report contained an apparent extra digit.
• A properly formatted number used a 703 area code, associated with Northern Virginia.
• None of the SIMs currently appearing around the detention site corresponded to the known number.
• The agents therefore could not immediately identify Conrad’s device from their existing records.

Ernie decided to identify the owners of the phones through telecom or leaked-data sources.

• Andy could have used law-enforcement channels to request telecom records, but this would require justification and could leave a traceable record.
• The team did not want to create an obvious official paper trail.
• Ernie instead used his Computer Science skill of 80 to search leaked databases and other sources.
• He rolled 26, succeeding.
• Rather than directly compromising a telecom company during the session, the result was represented as Ernie knowing where to search among accumulated hacks, leaks, and other data sources.

Ernie successfully associated several of the repeatedly detected devices with names.

• One belonged to Ethan Bailey.
• One belonged to Huang Lanfan.
• One belonged to Terry Smedley.
• Terry Smedley was immediately significant because he was already known to the investigation.

Ernie continued investigating the identities and addresses associated with those phone records.

• He made another Computer Science roll.
• The second roll was a critical success.
• With the combination of names, telephone identifiers, and leaked records, he was able to obtain considerably more personal information.
• The information included addresses and enough additional data to support a deep background search.
• The search also exposed sensitive personal information such as Social Security numbers, credit-card information, birth information, and other details commonly present in compromised identity databases.

The background research established more about Ethan Bailey.

• Bailey was approximately 31 years old.
• He was from Texas and originally from the Houston area.
• He had worked in prison or law-enforcement-related positions since his early 20s.
• He had previously worked as a corrections officer in the Texas prison system.
• The agents did not find an obvious criminal record or any background feature comparable to Terry Smedley’s known extremist or racist history.
• With the critical success, Ernie was able to establish that Bailey had a connection to Life Force, although the exact nature of his current work at the El Paso facility was not publicly documented.

The background research established more about Huang Lanfan.

• Lanfan was a health-care professional and apparently a registered nurse.
• She was an immigrant who had lived in the United States for approximately 15 years.
• She had worked at various hospitals.
• Her employment with Life Force was comparatively recent, beginning only a couple of years earlier.
• The agents were able to connect her to Life Force but not to a publicly documented position at the El Paso site.

The search also reinforced what the agents already knew about Terry Smedley.

• Smedley worked for Life Force.
• His previously identified racist or extremist background remained the most immediately concerning feature of his personal history.
• The agents could connect his employment to Life Force, but there was no public record explicitly saying that he worked at the El Paso facility.

Jerry and the rest of the team researched Life Force itself.

• The company operating the site was identified as Lafferty Youth Facilitation Force, abbreviated or referred to as Life Force.
• It was one of multiple businesses operated by the Lafferty family.
• The Lafferty companies worked in areas adjacent to prison security, private prisons, and similar detention-related services.
• Life Force was owned by Kyle Lafferty.
• It was administered by his son, Jason Lafferty.

The agents reviewed the known connection between Jason Lafferty and Jacob Tillman.

• Jason Lafferty and Jacob Tillman had been roommates during their freshman year of college.
• Tillman also had a history involving Lafferty facilities.
• His father had allegedly left him in Lafferty detention facilities while traveling in connection with his books.
• This made the Lafferty connection potentially significant rather than merely incidental.
• The company itself was much larger than the single El Paso facility and operated multiple businesses and facilities.
• The agents therefore recognized the disturbing possibility that, if the company itself were implicated rather than merely a handful of individuals, the problem could extend well beyond El Paso.
• They did not establish that broader conclusion during the session.

Public research showed that the Lafferty companies were closely connected to the Trump administration.

• They performed subcontracting work with ICE and provided services associated with private prisons and detention.
• A previous scandal had involved a Lafferty youth-security operation that provided armed security at elementary schools.
• In that incident, one of the company’s personnel had reportedly used a Taser on an eight-year-old child.
• Despite the company’s known detention-related work, the Frank Harvey site was not publicly advertised as an ICE detention center.
• There were no visible signs identifying it as such.

The team considered using official government systems to research the company’s relationship with ICE in greater depth.

• Andy could potentially give Ernie his DEA credentials to access government records.
• Alternatively, Ernie could try to access the systems without authorization.
• Andy preferred obtaining direct physical access to the facility rather than spending substantial time investigating contracting records.
• He believed physically entering the site could reveal more useful information about the immediate tactical situation.

The agents developed the idea of using Andy as a physical penetration tester.

• Andy could approach the site openly as a DEA agent with a plausible investigative reason for being there.
• Once inside, he could potentially leave surveillance devices behind.
• Ernie could prepare malicious USB devices for Andy to connect to or leave near computer systems.
• The team discussed the possibility of exploiting the tendency of personnel to plug in apparently abandoned USB drives.
• Andy could also plant cameras while on the premises.
• Ernie preferred waiting approximately 24 hours before sending Andy inside so that the team could first establish the normal pattern of activity and collect as much external intelligence as possible.
• This would also reduce the risk of Andy being recognized later during surveillance before the team understood the facility.

The agents continued monitoring the facility as the sun rose.

• A battered truck arrived at the main gate.
• A man got out and physically removed chains securing the gate.
• He then appeared to use a remote or other control to open it.
• He parked near the gatehouse and took up a position there.
• Approximately 10 to 15 minutes later, several additional vehicles arrived.
• Some employees parked at the front of the water-reclamation plant.
• Other vehicles continued toward the rear facility.
• Vehicles leaving and arriving around this time strongly suggested an organized shift change.
• There were somewhat more vehicles present during the daytime shift than had been present overnight.
• The StingRay also began detecting significantly more cell phones.

The agents identified an individual they believed to be Tillman during the morning arrivals.

• He appeared to be a young man, no older than his mid-20s.
• He had a notably youthful or baby-faced appearance.
• He drove a large Ford SUV.
• Unlike many workers, he was not wearing the yellow polo shirt that appeared to function as a staff uniform.
• He entered the facility through the front.
• The agents did not detect an obvious new cellular device corresponding with his arrival.
• They therefore still lacked a confirmed phone associated with him.
• They did, however, have his vehicle available for later identification or license-plate research.

The team remained on the hill throughout the day in order to establish staffing patterns and count personnel.

• Andy had the best Alertness skill at 70 and made the Alertness roll requested by the Handler.
• He succeeded.
• The successful observation allowed the group to notice detailed patterns of movement and activity around the facility.

The extreme heat became a significant operational problem.

• The Handler required every agent to make a Constitution ×5 check.
• All four agents failed.
• They had brought water and sunscreen, but the July Texas heat was still punishing.
• The agents suffered from prolonged exposure, sweat, and exhaustion.
• Each agent lost 1d6 Willpower from enduring the day on the exposed surveillance position.

During the daytime shift, the agents identified an apparent staff uniform.

• Many personnel arriving, departing, or moving around the rear facility wore yellow shirts or yellow polo shirts.
• A few individuals, including the suspected Tillman, wore ordinary street clothes instead.

The agents observed a sheriff’s vehicle arrive at the facility.

• Personnel in yellow shirts opened the gates and allowed the sheriff’s vehicle through.
• It passed through the main gate and then through the secondary gate to the rear building.
• The rear facility’s garage door was opened.
• The sheriff’s vehicle drove inside.
• It remained there for approximately 20 minutes.
• When it arrived, the agents could see what appeared to be another person in the rear seat, probably a prisoner.
• When the sheriff’s vehicle departed, that person was no longer in the vehicle.
• The person delivered to the facility was clearly an adult rather than a child.
• This demonstrated that the detention site was receiving adult detainees as well as whatever children the agents believed might be held there.

The agents observed ordinary activity elsewhere in the water-reclamation plant during the day.

• A golf cart was parked near the office portion of the main plant.
• Two people came out and drove the cart around the complex.
• They visited the gate area and spent time talking with the gatehouse attendant before returning.
• Later in the day, the same two individuals came outside again.
• One appeared to dance while the other recorded the activity with a phone.
• They then returned inside.
• This activity appeared distinct from the operations at the rear detention building.

The agents also noted air-conditioning equipment.

• The main water-reclamation plant had an office-like section without the large industrial pipes and machinery visible elsewhere.
• Air-conditioning condensers were visible around that portion of the facility.
• Multiple condensers were also visible along the southern side of the rear building.
• The rear building therefore appeared to be substantially air-conditioned.

By the end of the full surveillance period, the agents had developed a reasonable estimate of the site’s staffing.

• The daytime staff appeared to consist of approximately nine people.
• The Handler stated that the team could identify nine people closely enough to use that as the day-shift count.
• The night shift was smaller, approximately five people.
• Based on Andy’s law-enforcement experience and Jerry’s corrections background, the daytime staffing seemed barely plausible depending on the exact number of detainees inside.
• The night staffing appeared clearly below what the agents would expect under ordinary prisoner-to-staff rules.
• The team still did not know how many detainees were actually being held in the building.

After approximately 24 hours of surveillance, the agents had confirmed several important facts.

• The rear facility was active and continuously staffed.
• It was not an abandoned or purely industrial structure.
• At least one adult detainee had been delivered by the sheriff during the observation period.
• The day shift had approximately nine staff members.
• The night shift had approximately five staff members.
• Terry Smedley’s phone was present at or near the facility.
• Ethan Bailey and Huang Lanfan also had phones repeatedly present there and both could be tied to employment with Life Force.
• A young man matching the team’s expectations for Tillman had been seen entering the facility.
• The site received cooperation from local law enforcement.
• The team still lacked a reliable count of detainees, direct knowledge of the building’s interior layout, and a complete understanding of which personnel were actively involved in Tillman’s unnatural activities.

As the sun began setting after the agents’ full day of observation, the Handler ended the session.

• The agents were left to consider what they had learned and decide on their next move.
• Their likely next steps included determining whether Andy should enter the facility under DEA cover, planting surveillance or computer-access devices, continuing electronic surveillance, and developing an actual operational plan before Jesse’s promised follow-up call.
• The final in-game assessment was that the facility contained real detainees and a relatively small but significant staff presence, but the agents still lacked enough information to safely attempt a direct assault.